Recent Philosophical Work on the Doctrine of the Eucharist

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Abstract
The doctrine of the Eucharist has been one of the more fruitful locales of philosophical reflection within Christian theology. The central philosophical question has been, ‘what is the state of affairs such that it is apt to say of a piece of bread, “This is the body of Christ”? In this article, I offer a delineation of various families of answers to this question as they have been proffered in the history of the church. These families are distinguished by how they view the presence of the body of Christ as well as the continued presence of the bread and wine after consecration. I then provide a specific examination of some recent attempts to explicate these views. A number of the recent work has focused on the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, but I also survey consubstantiation, transignification, and a recent revival of impanation as potential means for describing the metaphysical realities of the Eucharist.

1. State of the Question
According to the Synoptic Gospels and the Apostle Paul’s first letter to the church at Corinth, on the night before Jesus Christ was crucified, he gathered his disciples together for a meal. During the course of that meal, he took a piece of bread and a measure of wine and predicated of each, respectively, ‘This is my body’ and ‘This is my blood’. Since that time, Christian ministers in the context of Eucharistic liturgies have likewise said similarly of bread and wine, ‘This is the body of Christ’ and ‘This is the blood of Christ’. How one is to understand the meaning of these phrases has been the source of much philosophical and theological wrangling over the past two millennia. This is not at all surprising given (a) those utterances seem somewhat out of the ordinary, and (b) the Eucharist stands at the heart of Christian worship. In my estimation, the fundamental philosophical query associated with the Eucharist in the tradition and in the recent literature is, ‘What is the state of affairs such that it apt to say of a piece of bread, “This is the body of Christ”?‘

2. A Spectrum of Answers
There is something of a spectrum of answers to this question as they have been proffered in the history of Christian philosophical theology. I delineate three families of answers to this question, which are distinguished by the mode of Christ’s presence to which they hold. On what we might call the far left of the spectrum is the Corporal Mode (CM), which states that at the consecration of the Eucharistic elements, the substances of Christ’s body and blood become present in some robust metaphysical fashion related to the consecrated elements. For CM views, one might say that it is the actual body of Christ, and its relation to the objects on the altar, that makes it apt to say of the consecrated bread “This is the body of Christ”. Next along the spectrum is the Pneumatic Mode (PM) family of views. This family holds that Christ is present in a non-substantial, or ‘spiritual’, way. In this family, the liturgical utterance must be understood to mean ‘This is like the body of Christ’ or ‘This symbolizes the body of Christ’. Finally, on the far right are views that fall under the No special presence Mode (NM), which
states that Christ is not present in the elements in any way more unique than his general presence in the cosmos. Thus, the liturgical utterance is to be understood as ‘there is no metaphysical connection between this object and the body of Christ, but you should think about Jesus Christ when you see or eat it’. This study will focus on the CM and PM family of views, for those have proved the most philosophically interesting in the history of the Church and in the recent literature.

Within a genealogy of the CM family of views, one can trace a number of offsprings, which I will here call manners. These manners all hold that at the consecration of the elements, some new metaphysical state of affair occurs. For instance,

*Capernite manner*

(i) Christ’s body is substantially present.
(ii) The sensible qualities of Christ’s body are present.
(iii) The bread is no longer present.
(iv) The sensible qualities of bread are no longer present.

In reality, this manner is a hypothetical position. The name comes from the befuddled audience at Christ’s discourse in John 6 who seemed to have thought that Christ was asking them to eat his body and drink his blood substance, properties, and all. ‘Capernite’ was a pejorative term used during the Reformation of those who held to any substantial presence of Christ in the Eucharist. This is not a position that, to my knowledge, anyone has actually attempted to defend, but helps to show specifically what CM theorists do not defend.

The following views, however, have been held in the history of the Church. Many philosophical investigations of the Eucharist have emerged as defenses and explications of the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. What I term the ‘Roman manner’ is an umbrella category that holds the following:

(i) Christ’s body is substantially present.
(ii) The sensible qualities of Christ’s body are not present.
(iii) The bread is no longer substantially present.
(iv) The sensible qualities of the bread are present.

The Roman view has been referred to as a ‘real presence/real absence’ view, whereby one must assent to the real presence of the body and the real absence of the bread. However, within the Roman manner, the tradition has distinguished further nuances regarding how the body comes to be present.

*Roman-annihilation*

Includes the ‘Roman’ i–iv and
(v) The substance of the bread is annihilated when the substance of Christ’s body arrives.

*Roman-transubstantiation*

Includes the ‘Roman’ i–iv and
(vi) The substance of the bread is converted into the substance of Christ’s body.

The two Roman views share the perspective that Christ’s body is substantially present and that the bread no longer is. Where they differ is on how this occurs. Roman-transubstantiation is the official position of the Roman Catholic Church, as noted especially at the Councils of Lateran IV, Constance, and Trent. Roman-annihilation was a position that some medieval commentators entertained as they sought to exposit the Roman Catholic Church’s official
position. Both of these views entail that there is a separation of substance from sensible qualities that occurs at the Eucharist. Both the body of Christ and the bread are divided along substance/sensible qualities lines. For the body of Christ, the substance arrives at the location of the bread, but none of its sensible qualities do. For the bread, its substance is removed, while all of its sensible qualities remain.

Another CM manner of views holds that the substance of the bread continues to be present, even while the substance of Christ’s body arrives. I term this category the ‘German manner,’ which is an umbrella term for holding these following positions:

(i) Christ’s body is substantially present.
(ii) The bread continues to be substantially present.
(iii) The sensible qualities of the bread are present.

The German manner might be a ‘real presence/real presence’ category, both the body of Christ and the bread are present. As with the Roman manner, however, the German view can be further subdivided into the following:

**German-consubstantiation**

Includes the ‘German’ i–iii and

(iv) The sensible qualities of Christ’s body are not present (NB: similar to the Roman ii).
(v) The body of Christ is ‘in, with, and under’ the bread.

**German-impanation**

Includes the ‘German’ i–iii and

(vi) The sensible qualities of the bread are the sensible qualities of the body of Christ.
(vii) A union between the bread and the body of Christ modelled on the Incarnation obtains.

German manners hold to the substantial presence of Christ’s body and blood as well as the continued existence of the bread and wine. Both ‘consubstantiation’ and ‘impanation’ carry some conceptual and ecumenical baggage; however, I am not here concerned with defending particular terms. I am interested in the states of affairs those terms are supposed to denote.

With this lay of the conceptual land in place, I can now proceed to a more specific review of discussions of the Eucharist in the recent philosophical literature. Much of this discussion has focused on the intelligibility and metaphysical possibility of the Roman-transubstantiation model to which we now turn.

3. Roman answers

The Roman view, like all CM views, holds that the actual body of Christ provides the metaphysical state of affairs that undergirds the aptness of the liturgical utterance. Roman-transubstantiation is the official position of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus not surprisingly has received much attention in the tradition and in the recent literature. I note that many of the contemporary treatments of transubstantiation hearken back to the explication of the doctrine by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Alexander Pruss (2011) presents one of the more sophisticated philosophic articulations of the twin Roman claims of the real presence of Christ’s body and the real absence of the bread in the Eucharist. On the former, he first surveys a number of options for achieving the real presence of Christ’s body at the location of the consecrated bread including a Leibniz-inspired partial presence option, an Aquinas-inspired placeless presence option, and options relating to curved space and bilocation. He then constructively pursues a couple of multi-location strategies for articulating the real presence of the whole of Christ’s body
in the Eucharist. Here is one such strategy, suppose ‘There is also a primitive relation \(L\) that can hold between an extended entity \(x\) and a non-empty set \(P\) of points in space at any given time. We can read \(LxP\) as “\(x\) is wholly located at \(P\)”’. Given this, what happens in the real presence on the present model is that the internal causal relations and intrinsic properties of Christ’s body remain as they were, but Christ’s body comes to be additionally \(L\)-related to the area in space to which the bread was previously related’ (Pruss 2011, 531). Thus, Christ is wholly multi-located (in heaven, on various altars, in every morsel of consecrated bread, etc.) by being appropriately related to various locations.

Pruss also wants to account for the real absence of the bread post-consecration and he offers a couple of ways of thinking about this. For instance, suppose the accidents of the bread, the sensible qualities of the bread, are akin to the appearances of, say, the sound of thunder after a lighting strike or the light from a distant star. It could be that the bread itself does not exist at present (but does in the past) while the appearances remain. Similar to how the sound of thunder can reach a human’s perceptive sphere well after the lightning strike or how the light from a distant star can appear well after the star has died. Thus, Pruss defends the philosophical possibility of the Roman manner.

Patrick Toner argues that transubstantiation can be adequately defended within an essentialist ontology. It might be supposed that if a piece of bread has some cluster of characteristic essential properties, and those properties are instantiated even after the consecration, then so is the bread. But, so Toner argues, it could simply be that God miraculously holds the cluster of characteristic properties together independent of a subject that has those properties. Somewhat similarly for the presence of the body without its sensible properties, Toner appeals to the notion of Christ having a glorified body that, on Thomas’ explicat, has the power to ‘be visible or invisible, tangible or intangible, at will’ (Toner 223). And the argument runs something like this, Christianity teaches that on the third day after his crucifixion, Jesus Christ was brought back to life by the power of the Holy Spirit. However, the body he had post-resurrection, while sufficiently similar to his pre-resurrection body so as to be recognized by his companions, also possessed the ability to enter locked rooms and suddenly vanish. Thus, there may be all kinds of properties that resurrected bodies possess that pre-resurrected bodies do not. So, Christ’s being able to multiply locate his body or locate the entirety of his body at the location of the host or other Eucharistic oddities might be no problem for a resurrected body. Thus, it does not seem to run afoul of essentialism to suppose that there could be the sensible properties of bread on the altar, but not bread, and the body of Christ, but which is not sensibly perceivable.

While I grant that we are unsure of the capacities of resurrected bodies, this line of defense does not work for the Eucharist because the first instance of the Eucharist occurred prior to Christ’s resurrection. We must remember that the whole impetus for this rite was the utterances Christ made on the evening before his death. Thus, one does not have recourse to the glorified body explanation for the first instance of the Eucharist. It seems to me that any explanation of the metaphysics of the Eucharist that cannot make sense of the first instance of the Eucharist, no matter how well it fares for subsequent instances, is a non-starter.

Martin Pickup attempts an explication of a CM view of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist with recourse to the concept of time travel. He operates with a Roman-transubstantiation manner in mind, but I think his view could make sense of either Roman view or German-consubstantiation. He needs the ability to separate the substance of an object from its sensible qualities if his analysis is to go through. This is a helpful move for these stated manners, for even if one grants the metaphysical possibility of the separation of substance from sensible qualities, one still needs an account for how the substance of the body of Christ could be multiply located.
If CM views are right, then is not Christ’s body at one time at the right hand of the Father and on an altar in Pasadena and on an altar in Boston and on an altar in London? This is particularly difficult if one holds an endurance theory about the persistence of objects across time. How could Christ’s body be wholly, multiply located? If time-travel is possible, then it could be the case that Christ enters his cosmic time-travel machine and simply ports his body to multiple locations throughout time and space (Pickup 6).

The second target of his analysis is the idea that at the distribution of the elements ‘all of the resulting entities are the whole body and blood of Christ’ (Pickup 3). How can it be? The notion of time-travel provides the ability to hold that ‘a single object can be multiply located at a time’ (Pickup 6). For Christ could just multiply-port his body to the location of each of the particular pieces of the consecrated elements (each piece of bread, each sip of wine). Thus the whole of his body is present, via time-travel, at every morsel of bread or sip of wine. Pickup admits this analysis is a bit bizarre and rests on the acceptance of a controversial account of time-travel, but for those for whom this is a conceptual possibility, the real presence along CM lines is also a conceptual possibility.\(^\text{16}\)

When a philosopher of the renown of G. E. M Anscombe writes on the Eucharist, it cannot be ignored. Her ‘On Transubstantiation’ presents a Roman perspective, but not along the same lines as the previous here discussed.\(^\text{17}\) Her post-Wittensteinian model focuses on the manner in which youth should be instructed in ways of speaking about the Eucharistic elements such that they come to treat the consecrated objects as no longer bread and wine, but as the actual body and blood of Christ. She does not stray into metaphysical talk, but instead focuses on a Wittensteinian way of life motif. Her view thus presents a helpful counterbalance to the metaphysical gymnastics typical of expositions of the Roman position.\(^\text{18}\)

4. Non-Roman Answers

The views surveyed so far have attempted defenses and explications of the CM Roman-transubstantiation manner’s answer to the question, ‘What is the metaphysical state of affairs such that it is apt to say of the consecrated bread, “This is the body of Christ”?’ This next section will present some attempts to answer this question without recourse to the denial of the presence of the bread that is the hallmark of the Roman theory.

I first offer Richard Cross’ piece as something of a transitional one between Roman and non-Roman theories of the Eucharist.\(^\text{19}\) In fact, Cross thinks that closer attention to the nature of action could bring about a unification of the Calvinist strain of PM models, the Roman, and the German CM models of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In order to pursue this line of rapprochement, one has to accept the notion that immediate causation from a distance is bodily presence, of the sort desired in Eucharistic discussions. Cross argues that the kind of sacramental presence the body of Christ enjoys in the Eucharist is a definitive presence, where this kind of presence is like the way immaterial substances are located at places, by causing effects at those locations. Thus, ‘a substance is definitively present at a place if it directly or immediately causes an effect at that place without being spatially present at that place’ (Cross 2002, 303). The action-at-a-distance motif is to assuage a worry of those PM theorists in the Reformed tradition that insist Christ is currently bodily sitting at the right hand of the Father (as the Creed states). For them, this entails some non-bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist. But if Cross’ definition of bodily presence is granted, than all one has to accept is that Christ performs some immediate action at the location of the elements and this entails his presence, indeed his bodily presence. This would then serve to undergird the aptness of the liturgical utterance. This also, so Cross argues, fits nicely with Calvin’s emphasis on Christ being in the Eucharist by his virtue or power despite Calvin’s worries about substantial bodily presence.\(^\text{20}\)
Terence Nichols states that he is articulating a Roman-transubstantiation model. However his view, to my mind, fits more neatly with the PM model known as transignification that was proffered by Edward Schillebeeckx in the last century. Nichols asks a similar question as that which Schillebeeckx pursued, ‘how do we understand transubstantiation now that we no longer have a substance ontology?’ Nichols’ solution is simply to hold that the bread and the wine become incorporated into the body of Christ so as to no longer be independent substances. As he puts it, ‘The bread and wine do not cease being what they are – their chemical structure and form remain the same, else they could not function as food – but they cease to be independently existing substances and become incorporated into another substance, the Body and Blood of the Lord, as subsidiary entities’ (Nichols 2002, 70). First, no one, save Capernites, holds that the chemical structure of the bread and the wine change, so saving a view from this allegation seems inconsequential. Secondly, despite Nichols’ avows to the contrary, his articulation does not fall within the Roman-transubstantiation model of the Eucharist, as I have delineated it. Again, he writes, ‘in this interpretation, transubstantiation does have many analogies in nature; it is common for elements to be incorporated into greater wholes while remaining themselves. Their relationships are changed, of course, but not their ontological essence’ (Nichols 2002, 73). On my nomenclature, if a model of the Eucharist retains the ‘ontological essence’ of the bread, then one has a German, PM, or NM model. Nichols does at one point make brief mention of the Incarnation as a motif for understanding his Eucharistic explication, thus German-impanation might be the best manner to categorize this view. If the emphasis on the Incarnation as an explanatory motif for the incorporation relation were not followed, it is hard to see how this view would not slip into the PM category.

Michael Dummett and H.E. Baber present views that more self-consciously align with Schillebeeckx’s transignification. Their theories attempt to ‘save the phenomena’ of the real presence while not appealing to the sorts of metaphysics employed by our previous theorists. The basic idea behind a transignification theory is that questions about what an object is are more properly questions about what an object means. For instance, Dummett uses a simple example of a Pyrex dish that was probably intended to be used for food, but he uses as an ashtray. Is the object into which Dummett casts his cigarette ashes a dish or an ashtray? He asserts that he has the right to determine the meaning of this object, and since he uses it as an ashtray, it is in fact an ashtray. Similarly, the bread of the Eucharist might have been intended to be just ordinary Passover fare, but after Christ deemed the bread his body, it was in fact his body. Dummett places emphasis on the act of ‘deeming’ (250) that Christ performs with respect to the elements. Because Christ is God, his deemings are to be taken as authoritative by any who believe him to be God. He states that taking the bread as Christ’s body requires the antecedent belief in the Incarnation, and thus those who do not have the requisite antecedent belief cannot be expected to hold the deeming to have obtained.

Baber follows suit in the transfiguration motif in her two recent articles, explicitly invoking Dummett in her 2013a piece. Baber avers that her transignification model grounds the aptness of the liturgical utterance, and does so in a much more metaphysically simple manner than previous attempts. She construes the change in the elements to be a matter of a change in the institutional conventions respecting the elements. Baber states, ‘On the proposed account, the act of consecration is a conventionally generated action analogous to, for example, the act of writing out a cheque’ (2013b, 21). By all empirical counts, a rectangular piece of paper with numbers and letters on it is literally worth no more than a piece of paper. Yet, given certain conditions constituted by particular social and institutional conventions, a check one writes for $200 is, on Baber’s view, $200. The meaning of the object goes beyond its ontological makeup.
Might one allege that this view is simply subjective, being based on the psychological states of the participants in the liturgy? Baber argues that the presence of the body of Christ qua institutional fact is similar to other social conventions,

But marriage, money, boundaries, and the like are not ‘subjective’. They are the products of collective rather than individual intentionality and the institutions in which it is embodied. An individual cannot by his own initiative, through believing, wishing, or acting as if it were so, enter into or dissolve a marriage, acquire citizenship or increase the value of his portfolio. And, on the account proposed here, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is likewise secured by the collective intentionality of an institution, viz. the Church (Ibid, 26).

However, like Dummett’s view, assenting to the truth of the metaphysical state of affairs that undergirds the liturgical utterance requires the antecedent participation in the relevant institution that sanctions the institutional fact of that object being the body of Christ.

CM theorists tend to hold Christ’s body to be present independent of the perceptive experience of anyone, members of the Church, believers in the Incarnation, etc. The body of Christ is present to encounter regardless of one’s beliefs or participation in a linguistic community. For transfiguration views, the body of Christ does not metaphysically undergird the aptness of the liturgical utterance, rather it is the declaration of the linguistic community that grounds the truth of the phrase ‘This is the body of Christ.’ Declaring as, deeming as, designating as, etc. do not bring about a connection between the elements that are perceived and the body of Christ. It would seem to be preferable for a theory to deliver a robust metaphysical story for how the actual body of Christ underwrites the liturgical utterance. If before me were a Pyrex dish and an ashtray, my cigar remnants would go in the ashtray.22

4.2. GERMAN-IMPAHATION

One such theory that purports to ground the aptness of the liturgical utterance with a robust metaphysical explication has been known as impanation. In so doing, this model uses the metaphysical resources of its near homophone the Incarnation. Recall that German models hold to the presence of Christ’s body without recourse to denying the continued existence of the bread. German-consubstantiation says that the bread and the substance of the body of Christ (with none of its sensible qualities) are colocated. German-impanation posits a union between the elements and Christ that is patterned after the Incarnation.

Marilyn Adams identifies two main types of impanation as they have been explored in the tradition.23 The first type posits a union between the bread and the second person of the Trinity. Adams states that in this model, ‘the Divine Word assumes the Eucharistic bread the way that He assumes the human nature’ (Adams 2006, 305). Further, ‘just as the Divine Word becomes incarnate (en-fleshed) when it assumes a particular human nature into hypostatic union with itself, so the Divine Word becomes im-panate (em-breaded) when – at the moment of consecration – it hypostatically assumes the Eucharist bread nature on the altar’ (Ibid. 296). I denote this model of impanation as ‘Type-H Impanation’.24 (Arcadi 2015, 5). A second type of impanation posits that the Incarnation-like union obtains between the body of Christ and the bread. ‘Like a human soul, the human body of Christ is not a complete individual substance, but only part of one. If one allows with Ockham that God could make an individual substance nature depend on a substance part, then one could say that the human body of Christ is the proximate assumer of the bread nature’ (Adams 2006, 306). I term this impanation model ‘Type-S Impanation’25 (Arcadi 2015, 5). Where Type-H Impanation posits a union between the person of the Word and the elements,
Type-S Impanation posits a union between the human body of Christ and the elements. In a recent article (Arcadi 2015), I explore Type-S Impanation as an attractive model of explicating the aptness of the liturgical utterance. The attractiveness of this model comes from the way that it fits with and makes use of Chalcedonian Christological metaphysical dynamics.26

On Chalcedonian Christology, a two-natures/one-person Christology, it is apt to say of Jesus Christ, ‘This is God’ and ‘This is a man.’ German Eucharistic theories will likewise hold that it is apt to say of the consecrated bread, ‘This is the body of Christ’ and ‘This is a piece of bread,’ the latter not having to be denied to make room for the former. The hypostatic union denotes the manner that the two natures of Christ are joined together in one person. One way of conceiving of this kind of union is to construe it as an instrumental union. When the divine Word uses his human nature a union is formed that is tight enough to countenance the claims that Christ ‘is a man’ while it was always apt to say he ‘is God.’ Similarly, Type-S Impanation can say that when Christ uses the consecrated elements a union obtains such that they become significant parts of his body, and may be referred to as such.27 Type-S Impanation grants that it may be odd to refer to the consecrated bread as the body of Christ, but no more odd than to refer to Jesus Christ as God, a claim that stands at the heart of not just Christian worship, but Christianity itself.

Short Biography

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Notes

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1 This is what Michael Dummett states as his pursuit when he says, ‘I propose to understand the doctrine as requiring no more than that the correct and unqualified answer to the question, “What is it?” asked of either of the consecrated elements, is “The Body of Christ” or “The Blood of Christ”’ (234). This also fits with an important theological approach to the topic by George Hunsinger, ‘There is arguably an irreducible minimum […] that pertains to the liturgical use of the statement “This is my body”. Eucumenically it is not enough to interpret it either as “This signifies my body” or as “This contains my body” […] it must be possible for all traditions to assert – without equivocation – at the level of first-order discourse as found in the liturgy, that the relation of “This bread” to “my body” is actually one of real predication’ (60).

2 I am not here concerned so much with an historical explication, but rather engaging with contemporary constructive work. Still for discussions of historical treatments of the Eucharist, see: for Leibniz – Backus, Fouke, Murray; for Descartes – Alexandrescu, Heil; for a definitive examination of later medieval philosophical treatments of the Eucharist, see Adams (2010); for the metaphysics of a PM view in the seventeenth century, see Gellera; for Suárez, see Sullivan and Reedy.

3 Where ‘mode’ refers to the ontological status of the body or blood of Christ, for instance an insistence on the substantial presence of Christ in the elements.

4 Christian traditions I would associate with this perspective would be Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheranism, and some streams of Anglicanism.
I understand that the term ‘substance’ is problematic and that in the mouth of Leibniz or Descartes or Thomas Aquinas that word will mean different things for respective Eucharistic theologies. Whereas many of the authors in the contemporary discussion use that term in a neo-Aristotelian/neo-Thomist fashion, the term need not be held captive by the philosophical descendants of the Stagirite Philosopher or the Angelic Doctor. I try to employ this term somewhat neutrally as something like the fundamental reality of an object.

For the sake of convenience, I will tend to focus in this study on the bread/body utterance, all that is said for these are intended to apply to the wine/blood utterance as well.

This mode is most often associated with Protestants who take Martin Bucer, John Calvin, and Thomas Cranmer as their theological progenitors, such as Presbyterian, Reformed, Methodist, and other streams of Anglican traditions. Calvin’s views can be found in the Institutes 4.17, for commentary see Gerrish, Mathison. Cranmer’s views can be found in his 1550 and 1551 works, for commentary see Brooks, Arcadi (2010).

This view is often associated with Huldrych Zwingli and those Christian denominations who claim him as a theological ancestor, for instance Baptist, Pentecostal, and many Free Church traditions. For Zwingli especially, see Stephens and Zwingli and Bullinger.

Where ‘manner’ refers to specific nuances of explication that an individual viewpoint within a mode employs.

There is also much dispute in the tradition as to the ‘when’ of consecration; I here leave that question open. For a discussion of what consecration is and how it may occur see Arcadi (2013).

This view has been referred to as ‘immoderate realism’ by Douglas. See also his very helpful historical survey of theologies of the Eucharist in the Anglican tradition at: http://anglicaneucharistictheology.com/Anglican_Eucharistic_Theology/Welcome.html

See especially the conciliar statements of Lateran IV, Constance, and Trent, which can be found in Tanner.

Further discussions of Roman-transubstantiation can be found in Pawl, Cassidy, Inman, and Conn.

For summary and commentary on her view, as well as Michael Dummett’s theory (to be discussed below) see Kerr (1999).

Cross specifically says that in his article the continued or discontinued presence of the bread is not of concern to him.

But for a counter-opinion, see Helm. For another discussion of the kinds of presence one might find in the Eucharist, see Davis.

See Schillebeeckx. Of course, there are plenty of metaphysicians today (Roman Catholic or otherwise) that might object to Schillebeeckx and Nichols’ declaration that certain ontologies are dead.

It might be noted that in her article, Anscombe asserts that what is really transignified in the Eucharist is not the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, but rather just the inverse.


Where ‘H’ stands in for the kind of union, ‘hypostatic.’

Where ‘S’ stands in for the kind of union, ‘sacramental.’

I also argue that this is the best CM model of the Eucharist for those who are persuaded by an idealist ontology in Arcadi (2016).

This is not specifically the route Cross pursues in his article, but the similarities are obvious. Type–S Impanation is most concerned with following the Incarnation, but the instrumental/action motif of accounting for the Incarnation leads an in-kind Eucharistic discussion to a similar conclusion as Cross.

Works Cited


